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Jersey v. G.V, 162 N.J. 252, 744 A.2d 137 (2000).
In 1985, G.V., the defendant, started to molest his six-year-old
daughter, Laura. See New Jersey v. G.V, 162 N.J. 252, 255, 744 A.2d
137, 139 (2000). During these sexual encounters, defendant touched
Laura's private areas, and Laura was forced to touch the private areas
of the defendant. The encounters occurred in the evening, when
Laura's mother was working. When Laura reached eight years of age,
the defendant began to engage in sexual intercourse with her. In
addition, the defendant forced Laura to perform sexual acts with her
younger brother. The defendant threatened to kill Laura, her family,
and her pets if she disclosed these activities to anyone. The sexual
abuse ceased in 1990 when Laura was ten years old.
Sometime in 1989, the defendant separated from Laura's
mother and moved out of the family home. When the defendant
returned to the house with his new girlfriend in January of 1992, an
altercation erupted between defendant and Walter, Laura's brotherin-law. During this scuffle, the defendant threatened to kill Walter.
Subsequently, Laura's mother summoned the police and secured a
temporary restraining order against the defendant. Nevertheless,
believing that reconciliation with the defendant was still possible,
Laura's mother vacated the restraining order only two days later.
This violent incident spawned a period of deep depression for
Laura. See id. at 256, 744 A.2d at 139. After relatives found her with
her body clenched, unable to speak, and staring into space, Laura was
hospitalized. During a group therapy session at the hospital, Laura
disclosed her history of sexual abuse to another girl and later
reported the defendant's conduct to a hospital nurse. Hospital staff
members subsequently informed Laura's family and the Division of
Youth and Family Services about the sexual abuse. When Laura's
sister, Linda, learned of this abuse, she revealed that the defendant
had also molested her on nights when her mother was at work. Linda
claimed that the defendant sexually abused her between the ages of
four and eight and began having sexual intercourse with her when
she was only six years old.
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The defendant was charged with sexual abuse. See id. The
defendant was not charged, however, with any offenses with respect
to his alleged molestation of Linda because the statute of limitations
had expired. See id.
At trial, the defendant argued that Laura fabricated the claims of
sexual misconduct because he had left her mother for another
woman. See id. The trial court admitted Linda's testimony that the
defendant had also molested her. See id. at 258, 744 A.2d at 141. The
trial court reasoned that the other-crime evidence was material
because it may tend to disprove any defense that the sexual
encounters were an accident and to establish that the defendant
engaged in this conduct for the purpose of sexual gratification or
arousal, an essential element of the sexual assault offense. See id. at
258-59, 744 A.2d at 141. While the trial judge instructed the jury that
this other-crime evidence should not be construed as demonstrating
that the defendant was disposed to commit the crimes charged, the
judge failed to limit consideration of that evidence to issues that were
genuinely in dispute. See id. at 254, 744 A.2d at 138. Consequently,
the jury convicted the defendant on all four counts, and he was
sentenced to an aggregate imprisonment of fifteen years. See id.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, reversed
the trial court, holding that Linda's other-crime testimony was
inadmissible because there was no genuine dispute regarding the
defendant's intent to obtain sexual arousal or the defense of mistake,
which the defendant never asserted. See id. The appellate division
also determined that the prejudice of this other-crime evidence
See id. Moreover, the
clearly outweighed its probative value.
appellate division speculated that Linda's other-crime testimony
would be inadmissible for any purpose. See id. at 258, 744 A.2d at
141. Thus, the court set aside the defendant's convictions and
remanded the matter for a new trial. See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and
affirmed the holding of the appellate division. See id. at 254, 265, 744
A.2d at 139, 145. The court, in a per curiam opinion, held that,
because neither mistake nor intent to obtain sexual gratification was
genuinely in dispute, Linda's other-crime testimony was plainly
inadmissible. See id. at 259, 744 A.2d at 141. In addition, the court
stated that the erroneous admission of such testimony was highly
prejudicial and, therefore, required a reversal of the defendant's
convictions. See id. at 262, 744 A.2d at 143. Lastly, the court
concluded that, in a new trial, Linda's other-crime testimony might
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be admissible if the defendant raised the defense of victim bias or
vendetta. See id. at 264, 744 A.2d at 145.
The opinion commenced with an examination of the principles
governing the admission of other-crime evidence. See id. at 256, 744
A.2d at 140. Chief Justice Poritz and Justices O'Hern, Stein, and
Long joined in this section of the opinion. See id. The court noted
that, under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 404(b), other-crime
evidence is only admissible when it is necessary to prove a fact
genuinely in dispute. See id. at 257, 744 A.2d at 140 (citing State v.
Oliver, 133 N.J. 141, 151, 627 A.2d 144, 149-50 (1993)). In addition,
the court explained that such evidence can be admitted only when
the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect to the defendant.
See id. (citing State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 302, 558 A.2d 833, 840-41
(1989)). The court recounted that the other-crime principles have
been developed into a four-part test. See id. Other-crime evidence
should be excluded, noted the court, unless such evidence (1) is
relevant to a material issue in dispute; (2) is reasonably close in time
and similar in kind to the charged offense; (3) is clear and
convincing; and (4) has a probative value that outweighs its apparent
prejudice.
See id. (citing Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the
Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b), and 609(a), 38
EMoRYL.J. 135, 160 (1989)).
Furthermore, the court maintained that, when other-crime
evidence is admitted under this four-prong test, a limiting instruction
must be given to the jury. See id. at 258, 744 A.2d at 140. This
instruction, the court observed, should explain the prohibited as well
as the permitted uses of the proffered evidence. See id. at 258, 744
A.2d at 140-41 (citing State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 341, 744 A.2d 230,
236-37 (1992)).
Additionally, the court warned that a limiting
instruction must make sufficient reference to the facts of the case
such that the jury will fully comprehend the parameters of its
consideration. See id.
Continuing the analysis of the court's per curiam opinion, Chief
Justice Poritz, again joined by Justices O'Hern, Stein, and Long,
applied this evidentiary standard to the case at hand. See id. Initially,
the court chastised the trial judge for relying on State v. Cusick, 219
N.J. Super. 452, 530 A.2d 806 (App. Div. 1987), in admitting Linda's
other-crime testimony. See id. at 258-59, 744 A.2d at 141-42. In
Cusick, the court explained, other-crime evidence of prior sexual
abuse was admitted to rebut the defendant's claim of mistake and to
establish his debated intent. See id. at 258, 744 A.2d at 141 (citing
Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. at 466, 530 A.2d 806 at 814-15). The court
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next deemed that the present matter is clearly distinguishable from
Cusick in light of the fact that the defendant never asserted the
defense of mistake. See id. at 258-59, 744 A.2d at 141-42. Rather, the
court declared, it would have been absurd for the defendant to do so
because he was charged with continued sexual depravity over a
period of several years. See id. at 259, 744 A.2d at 141-42. Moreover,
the court submitted that there was no genuine issue in dispute
because the defendant had molested Laura for the purpose of sexual
gratification. See id. at 259, 744 A.2d at 142. The court concluded
that Linda's other-crime testimony was improperly admitted to show
that the defendant was an individual predisposed to engage in sexual
activities with his young daughters. See id. at 261, 744 A.2d at 143.
The court subsequently focused the inquiry on the prejudicial
nature of the erroneously admitted evidence. See id. at 260, 744 A.2d
at 142.
The court noted that the plain error standard was
inapplicable because the defendant objected to admission of the
other-crime evidence at trial. See id. at 261, 744 A.2d at 143. The
court then shifted the focus to the harmless error doctrine. See id.
The harmless error doctrine, the court emphasized, should be used
only when there is little possibility that the trial error led to an unjust
verdict. See id. at 262, 744 A.2d at 143 (citing State v. Macon, 57 N.J.
325, 335, 273 A.2d 1, 6-7 (1971)). The harmless error doctrine, the
court continued, should not be invoked in sensitive areas of criminal
law designed to guarantee a fair trial. See id. at 262, 744 A.2d at 143.
The court commented that other-crime evidence that was
erroneously admitted may be considered harmful per se, as such
evidence almost always jeopardizes the defendant's ability to receive a
fair trial. See id. Moreover, the court declared that, when other-crime
evidence is incorrectly admitted, a large potential for prejudice exists
and ordinarily requires reversal. See id.
Shifting attention to the case at bar, the court determined that
the trial judge's incomplete jury instructions added to this high risk
of prejudice. See id., 744 A.2d at 144. The trial judge's charge in this
matter, the court explained, left the jury completely unguided with
respect to the correct interpretation of the other-crime evidence. See
id. Additionally, the court remarked that such inaccurate jury
instructions "are poor candidates for rehabilitation under the
harmless error theory." Id. at 263, 744 A.2d at 144 (citing State v.
Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 410, 526 A.2d 1077, 1084 (1987)). In light of
such harmful prejudice, the court concluded that defendant's
convictions should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
See id. at 263, 744 A.2d at 144.
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Justices O'Hern, Garibaldi, Stein, Coleman, and Verniero
concurred in the next part of the per curiam opinion, assessing
whether Linda's other-crime testimony might be relevant on retrial
for some other purpose. See id. Delineating the relevancy standard,
the court pronounced that evidence is relevant when it renders a
desired inference more probable than not. See id. (citing State v.
Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619, 477 A.2d 308, 312 (1984)). Thus, the court
reasoned that this other-crime evidence might be admissible on
retrial if the defendant contended that Laura fabricated the sexual
abuse allegations as revenge for the defendant's abandonment of her
mother. See id. at 264, 744 A.2d at 144. The court stated that Linda's
testimony would make it more probable than not that Laura's story
was the product of a vendetta or bias against the defendant. See id.
The court, however, warned that the defendant must affirmatively
place the vendetta defense into issue before Linda's other-crime
testimony would be admissible. See id., 744 A.2d. at 145. Analogously,
the court suggested that this other-crime evidence would also be
admissible to disprove any claim by the defendant that he lacked the
opportunity to be alone with Laura. See id. at 265, 744 A.2d at 145.
In a separate opinion, Justice Long, joined by Chief Justice
Poritz, concurred with the court's opinion with respect to the
principles governing the admission of other-crime evidence and its
application to the present case, but dissented from the court's
opinion regarding its admissibility on remand for other purposes. See
id. (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Long argued that on remand, Linda's other-crime testimony would
never be relevant to refute the defendant's vendetta defense. See id.
The justice disputed the notion that Linda's testimony would increase
the probability that Laura was not biased against the defendant. See
id. at 266, 744 A.2d at 145-46 (Long, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Rather, the justice insisted, only testimony that
illustrated Laura's affection toward the defendant or the acceptance
of her parents' separation would be admissible to rebut the bias
defense. See id. at 265-66, 744 A.2d at 145 (Long, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Fearing the dismantling of New Jersey
Rule of Evidence 404(b), Justice Long concluded by criticizing the
court for disregarding over two hundred years of evidentiary practice.
See id. at 266, 744 A.2d at 146 (Long, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
In another separate opinion, Justice Coleman, joined by Justices
Garibaldi and Verniero, concurred with the court's analysis regarding
the possible admission of Laura's testimony on remand, but dissented
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from the court's opinion regarding the principles governing the
admission of other-crime evidence and its application to the present
case. See id. at 265, 744 A.2d at 145 (Coleman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Coleman initially discredited the
court's determination that Linda's testimony was inadmissible. See id.
at 277, 744 A.2d at 152 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Under the court's four-prong test, the justice
proffered that the other-crime evidence was properly admitted at trial
because (1) it was relevant to defendant's motive in committing the
alleged sexual assault; (2) the testimony was similar in kind and
reasonably close in time to the charged offense of sexual assault; (3)
in light of the trial court's unique position to assess Linda's
credibility, there was no abuse of discretion in finding that her
testimony was clear and convincing; and (4) the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in ruling that the probative value of the othercrime evidence outweighed its prejudicial impact. See id. at 272-77,
744 A.2d at 149-52 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Justice Coleman next addressed whether the trial court's jury
instructions constituted reversible error. See id. at 277, 744 A.2d at
152 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
justice, supporting the adequacy of the jury charge, observed that the
charge informed the jurors that the testimony could be used to show
intent, motive, or a lack of mistake regarding the sexual assault, but
not to infer that the defendant was a bad person with a propensity to
commit the charged offenses. See id. at 278, 744 A.2d at 152
(Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In addition,
the justice avowed that, although the trial court did not instruct the
jury to do so, the other-crime evidence also could have been used to
evaluate Laura's credibility and to rebut any vendetta defense. See id.
at 279, 744 A.2d at 153 (Coleman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Conceding that the trial court improperly
permitted the jury to use the other-crime testimony for an irrelevant
purpose in connection with the aggravated sexual assault charge,
Justice Coleman submitted that this error lacked the effect of
bringing about an unjust verdict. See id. at 280-81, 744 A.2d at 153-54
(Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather, the
justice urged, this error resulted in no real prejudice to the
defendant because the other-crime evidence would be admissible on
retrial to rebut the vendetta defense. See id. at 281, 744 A.2d at 154
(Coleman,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The admission of other-crime evidence in criminal trials is a
dual-edged sword. While often necessary to prove an essential issue
in dispute, such evidence also carries an enormous risk of creating
undue prejudice against the defendant. To settle the struggle
between these competing interests, the United States Congress
recently promulgated Federal Rule of Evidence 414, which creates an
exception to the general exclusion of other-crime evidence by
permitting the admission of similar crimes in child molestation cases
for any relevant purpose. In doing so, Congress has announced a
distinct principle of public policy:
Protection of our nation's
children and prosecution of sexual predators supercedes the
avoidance of prejudice against the accused. Despite ample authority
to adopt an analogous rule, the New Jersey State Legislature has
failed to do so.
The present case illustrates the need for the Legislature to
reconsider the social policy goals contained within the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence. The record plainly illustrates that the defendant is
a depraved and ruthless sexual deviant who preyed upon the
innocence of his young daughters. Nevertheless, due to the violation
of an archaic rule of evidence, his convictions were reversed. The
NewJersey Legislature should not tolerate such an outcome. Rather,
the Legislature should follow the example of Congress and place the
rights of child molestation victims above those of the accused.
Joshua S. Bratspies

TORTS-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-THE
DISCOVERY RULE-WHEN A PATIENT HAS RELIED IN GOOD FAITH ON A
COMPETENT EXPERT OPINION THAT ONE OF HER TREATING
PHYSICIANS IS NOT AT FAULT AND DOES NOT NAME THAT PHYSICIAN IN
HER COMPLAINT, A SUBSEQUENT ASSERTION TO THE CONTRARY BY A

DEFENDANT DOCTOR'S EXPERT WITNESS PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR A
AGAINST THE ORIGINALLY OMITrED PHYSICIAN AND THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS TOLLED UNTIL THE SUBSEQUENT
CLAIM

ASSERTION-Mancuso v. Neckles, 163 N.J. 26, 747 A.2d 255 (2000).
In 1988, and again in 1989, Pia Mancuso underwent routine
mammographies. See Mancuso v. Neckles, 163 N.J. 26, 30, 747 A.2d
255, 257 (2000). The mammograms revealed what Dr. Beinart, the
radiologist who read the mammography films, determined to be a
benign cyst in Mancuso's right breast. In 1991, prior to having a
hysterectomy, Mancuso underwent another mammogram. As part of
the presurgery examination, Mancuso had the films from the 1988
and 1989 tests sent to Dr. Sireci, the radiologist responsible for
reading the 1991 films. Dr. Sireci examined the 1991 films along
with the 1988 and 1989 films for comparison and determined that
the 1991 films revealed "ovoid densities" in Mancuso's right breast.
Dr. Sireci then advised Mancuso's surgeon, Dr. Neckles, that he
should order follow-up studies on Mancuso within four months.
Mancuso was not told of the "ovoid densities" by Dr. Sireci, nor was
she advised of Dr. Sireci's warning to Dr. Neckles. Dr. Neckles did
not order the additional tests. See id. at 31, 747 A.2d at 258.
In July 1992, another mammogram was performed on Mancuso,
indicating the onset of breast cancer. The report accompanying this
study noted that the cysts identified as benign by Dr. Beinart in the
1988 and 1989 films "had not changed," but a "disturbance in the
same area" indicated the possibility of a cancerous growth.
Subsequent tests disclosed that Mancuso had a malignant tumor in
her right breast and showed that the cancer had spread to her
lymphatic system. In December 1992, Mancuso underwent a bone
marrow transplant and began chemotherapy at the Memorial Sloan
Kettering Cancer Center. See id at 35, 747 A.2d at 258, 260. During
this time, Mancuso was first told of the "ovoid densities" found by Dr.
Sireci in her 1991 mammogram films and of his advice to Dr.
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Neckles. No mention of any possible misdiagnosis by Dr. Beinart was
made at this time.
In June 1993, Mancuso contacted an attorney regarding the
failure of Dr. Neckles to order the follow-up tests recommended by
Dr. Sireci. See id. at 32, 747 A.2d at 258. The following June,
Mancuso's attorney submitted all of Mancuso's medical records to a
qualified medical expert to analyze for possible malpractice. The
expert determined that the 1991 failure by Dr. Neckles to order the
recommended follow-up tests constituted medical malpractice. The
expert did not mention any possible fault on the part of Dr. Beinart.
Based on the expert's report, Mancuso filed suit against Dr. Neckles,
his partners, and several John Doe defendants.
At trial in April 1996, an expert witness retained by Dr. Neckles
submitted a report stating that the 1989 mammography film reviewed
by Dr. Beinart revealed a possible malignancy. This report was
Mancuso's first indication of Dr. Beinart's possible malpractice in
evaluating the 1989 films. In November 1996, Mancuso's lawyer
contacted a different expert medical witness, who also opined that
the 1989 films revealed a possible malignancy and that Dr. Beinart's
evaluation of those films was negligent. In June 1997, Mancuso filed
an amended complaint naming Dr. Beinart as a defendant.
The law division, holding that the statute of limitations had run
on any possible claim, dismissed Mancuso's complaint against Dr.
Beinart. See id. at 33, 747 A.2d at 259. The appellate division
affirmed, stating that Mancuso "'should have been aware that her
expert's opinion was not necessarily the last word on the subject of
who might have done her wrong."' Id. (quoting Mancuso v. Neckles,
316 N.J. Super. 128, 134-35, 719 A.2d 716, 719 (App. Div. 1998)).
The appellate division further stated that a reasonable plaintiff would
have understood that the universe of possible defendants included
any radiologist who had examined the mammograms.
See id.
(quoting Mancuso, 316 N.J. Super. at 134-35, 719 A.2d at 719). The
New Jersey Supreme Court granted Mancuso's petition for
certification to determine the proper application of the discovery
rule in a complex medical malpractice case. See id. at 29, 747 A.2d at
256.
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice O'Hern, the New
Jersey Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the purpose and
history of the discovery rule in New Jersey. See id. The court noted
that the discovery rule tolls the accrual of a cause of action as long as
the injured person is reasonably unaware either that he or she has
suffered an injury or that the injury resulted from the fault of an
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identifiable party. See id. at 29, 747 A.2d at 256-57 (quoting Abboud v.
Viscomi, 111 N.J. 56, 62, 543 A.2d 29, 32 (1988)). Justice O'Hern
noted that, although statutes of limitations are designed to encourage
litigants to pursue their claims in a timely manner, when a potential
litigant is not aware of a claim, the policy of the statute of limitations
comes into conflict with notions of justice in the individual case. See
id. at 29, 747 A.2d at 257 (quoting Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron
Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 115, 299 A.2d 394, 396 (1973)). According to the
justice, the chief purpose of the discovery rule is to avoid a
mechanistic application of the statute of limitations to prevent
unfairness to persons who are not aware of their claims. See id., 747
A.2d at 256. The court determined that the time for the accrual of a
plaintiffs cause of action is either the time of discovery by the
plaintiff of her possible claim or the time at which she should have
discovered the possible claim through an exercise of reasonable
intelligence and diligence. See id. at 34, 747 A.2d at 259-60 (quoting
Vispisiano v. Ashland Chemical Co., 107 N.J. 416, 434, 527 A.2d 66, 76
(1987)).
The court went on to posit that the nature of the
information available to the plaintiff that will trigger the duty to
investigate a possible claim will depend on the type of claim involved.
See id., 747 A.2d at 260.
After reviewing the facts of the case, the court opined that
medical malpractice claims involving complex issues of causation
differ from ordinary torts in which the cause of injury is apparent. See
id. The court further noted that complex issues of causation and
"masked injury," in which the nature of the harm is uncertain or even
unknown, are typical of medical malpractice cases. See id. Adopting
the language of the Vispisiano court, Justice O'Hern then stated that,
in such cases, more than "mere speculation or an uniformed guess
'without some reasonable medical support"' is required to constitute
discovery of an injury and start the running of the statute of
limitations. Id. (quoting Vispisiano, 107 N.J. at 434, 527 A.2d at 76).
In declaring the rule, the court cautioned that simply because a case
involves "highly specialized medical knowledge" does not mean that
the plaintiff must have an expert medical witness's report before the
statute of limitations begins to run. See id. at 35, 747 A.2d at 260.
Instead, the court explained that such considerations are pertinent to
assessing the "nature of the information available" to the plaintiff. Id.
(citations omitted).
Applying the rule to the present case, the court determined that
Mancuso was reasonably unaware of her possible claim against Dr.
Beinart until her receipt of the expert's report for Dr. Neckles in
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1996. See id. Prior to the 1996 report, the court stated, the "nature of
the information" available to Mancuso did not indicate that Dr.
Beinart's negligence may have caused her cancer to spread. See id.
Justice O'Hern pointed out that two different radiologists had
reviewed her mammography films and both had failed to note any
misdiagnosis by Dr. Beinart. See id. Moreover, the court elaborated,
no doctor treating her at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center,
which the court described as "world renowned," in the years after her
bone marrow transplant, had alerted Mancuso to the possibility of
malfeasance on the part of Dr. Beinart. See id. Therefore, the court
concluded, Mancuso was not at fault in failing to pursue a claim
against Dr. Beinart before the 1996 report. See id.
Justice O'Hern next addressed the question of whether Mancuso
was under a duty to seek additional expert reports when she first
discovered her illness. See id. at 36, 747 A.2d at 261. The justice
rejected the notion that attorneys who retain experts to examine
medical records "target" a particular doctor as a possible defendant
or a particular theory of malpractice before obtaining the report. See
id. Rather, the justice explained, the purpose of such expert reports
is to obtain the best information available before filing a suit. See id.
According to the court, therefore, Mancuso was not under a duty to
keep retaining experts until one discovered Dr. Beinart's possible
malpractice. See id.
Moreover, Justice O'Hern oudined several limitations imposed
on litigants attempting to bring a lawsuit. See id. at 36-37, 747 A.2d at
261. First, the justice articulated the constraints created by New
Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, which requires an attorney to
have a reasonable belief, before filing, that a claim is not frivolous.
See id. Second, the court noted the New Jersey Frivolous Litigation
Statute, which provides compensation to victims of bad faith frivolous
suits. See id. at 37, 747 A.2d at 261 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:15-59.1
(1987 & Supp. 2000)). The justice intimated that had Mancuso filed
a complaint against Dr. Beinart prior to the 1996 disclosure, she and
her attorney might have run afoul of these prohibitions against
frivolous litigation. See id. Finally, the justice discussed the New
Jersey Affidavit of Merit Statute, which requires a plaintiff filing a
medical malpractice suit to obtain a medical expert witness's opinion
that there is a "'reasonable probability"' that the complained-of
conduct was "outside the acceptable professional standards" within
sixty days of filing or face dismissal. Id. (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2A:53A-27 (1987 & Supp. 2000)). The justice reasoned that the
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statute reinforced the requirement of a good faith belief in a suit. See
id.
Based on the examination of these limitations, the court
announced that when a patient relies on adequate expert advice
stating that one or more of his or her treating physicians was not a
cause of the patient's injuries, subsequent contrary assertions by a
qualified expert would then establish the basis of an actionable claim.
See id. at 37, 747 A.2d at 261-62. Therefore, the court concluded,
Mancuso did not possess the information triggering her duty under
the discovery rule until the 1996 deposition of Dr. Neckles's expert.
See id. at 36, 747 A.2d at 261.
Finally, the court addressed the requirement that the application
of the discovery rule does not unfairly prejudice the defendant by
delaying the filing of the claim. See id. at 37, 747 A.2d at 262. The
court noted that, despite the unfairness to the plaintiff, requiring a
defendant to answer a suit when the passage of time has resulted in
lost evidence or missing witnesses may be even more unfair. See id.
(quoting Lopez v. Suyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272, 300 A.2d 563, 566 (1973)).
The court concluded that, in the present case, Dr. Beinart would not
experience any undue prejudice by permitting Mancuso's suit
because the issue of Dr. Beinart's alleged malpractice involved only
his interpretation of the mammography films. See id. at 37-38, 747
A.2d at 262. Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the
appellate division, reinstated Mancuso's claim, and remanded the
case to the trial court. See id.
The court's decision goes far toward equalizing the information
disparity between patient-plaintiffs and the medical establishment by
allowing a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to benefit from the
discovery rule when a defendant doctor points to the negligence of
another physician not named in the action. By permitting a suit
against such a doctor, the court essentially treats the opinions of all of
the experts in the litigation as the "best possible information," rather
than merely as adversarial tools. In doing so, the court places the
search for the truth and the plaintiff's right to redress for her injury
ahead of the defendant's interest in repose. This a proper balancing
of the conflicting policies given the nature of the harms that flow to
each party.

Jeffrey L. Loop

TORTS-THE DISCOVERY RULE-A SWORN AND SIGNED WORKERS'
COMPENSATION PETITION MAY IMPUTE KNOWLEDGE OF A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS WITHOUT A
FORMAL EVIDENTIARY HEARING-Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co., 162 N.J.

545, 745 A.2d 525 (2000).
Kazimierz Lapka endured a long fight against the debilitating
effects of chronic pulmonary disease. See Lapka v. Porter Hayden Co.,
162 N.J. 545, 552, 745 A.2d 525, 528 (2000). Lapka began work at the
Essex Chemical Corporation (Essex) in 1967 as a hot-melt operator.
See id. at 549, 745 A.2d at 526. At Essex, Lapka was exposed daily to a
mixture of asbestos powder, urethane, dust, and other toxic
materials. See id., 745 A.2d at 526-27. On February 13, 1981, the first
signs of Lapka's pulmonary emphysema and lung disease appeared in
a chest x-ray. See id., 745 A.2d at 527. One week later, an emergency
room physician diagnosed Lapka's shortness of breath as "pulmonary
fibrosis and emphysema," compounded by "pleural thickening" in
the lungs. Upon return to work at Essex, Lapka was assigned to a new
position based on the advice of his personal physician and Essex's
corporate doctor. See id. at 550, 745 A.2d at 527.
On June 6, 1984, Lapka was again taken for emergency medical
treatment complaining of fatigue, weight loss, and labored breathing.
X-rays taken at the hospital confirmed that Lapka suffered from
"chronic obstructive pulmonary disease," likely caused by exposure to
pollutants housed at the Essex chemical factory. Following his
release from the hospital, Lapka initiated a petition for workers'
compensation with the New Jersey Division of Workers'
Compensation (Division). See id. at 551, 745 A.2d at 527.
The Division utilizes a two-page claim form that requires workers
to detail background information concerning the alleged injury. On
the pre-printed claim form, Lapka described his ailments as
"sustained pulmonary, and internal organ disability" stemming from
occupational exposures between 1967 and 1984. Id., 745 A.2d at 528.
Lapka supplemented his answers by explaining that his injury
stemmed from exposure to asbestos and industrial chemicals located
inside the Essex factory. Lapka authenticated his responses by
notarized signature on January 14, 1986. On March 24, 1986, Lapka
visited Dr. Malcolm H. Hermele for a physical evaluation to
1336

SURVEYS

1337

accompany his workers' compensation claim.
Lapka provided
Hermele with a detailed medical history, alleging exposure to
asbestos and more than two years of breathing disorders and fatigue.
See id. at 552, 745 A.2d at 528. Based on this information, Hermele
diagnosed Lapka with emphysema and pulmonary disease "causally
related to or exacerbated by the exposure to... noxious agents while
employed by Essex."
More than a decade later, on November 2, 1996, Lapka was
admitted to the hospital one last time. A personal history sheet
prepared by the admitting attendant stated that Lapka was diagnosed
with asbestos disease in 1984. Additional notations on Lapka's
patient chart listed asbestos and silicosis injuries arising in 1984 and
record Lapka's initial asbestosis diagnosis as "about 12 years ago." See
id., 745 A.2d at 528-29. All three records indicated that the relevant
dates of diagnosis were supplied by Lapka and his wife. See id., 745
A.2d at 528. Lapka died on November 3, 1996. See id., 745 A.2d at
529.
Lapka and his wife Emilia filed a complaint on March 24, 1988
against the Porter Hayden Company, the H.M. Royal Company, and
several other former asbestos manufactures alleging injuries from
asbestos and pulmonary disease contracted while handling the
defendants' products. See id. at 552-53, 745 A.2d at 529. On
November 24, 1997, the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division,
found the plaintiff's complaint untimely and, accordingly, dismissed
the action. See id. at 553, 745 A.2d at 529. The New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the lower court's dismissal. See id.
The appellate division determined that Lapka learned of his asbestos
injuries "at least" as early as January 14, 1986, based on the signed
statement of symptoms contained in Lapka's workers' compensation
claim. See id. The appellate division concluded that Lapka's workers'
compensation petition provided unquestionable evidence of Lapka's
knowledge concerning his illness. See id. The appellate division,
therefore, dispensed with a formal evidentiary hearing as normally
required under New Jersey Supreme Court precedent. See id. (citing
Lopez v. Sawyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272, 300 A.2d 563, 565-66 (1973)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to
determine whether a workers' compensation petition triggers the
two-year statute of limitations for commencing negligence actions.
See id. at 548, 745 A.2d at 526. Affirming the decision of the appellate
division, the court held that an unambiguous workers' compensation
claim, combined with detailed medical records, may evidence a
plaintiff's knowledge of an accrued cause of action. See id.
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Justice Verniero began the five-member majority opinion by
reciting the statue of limitation controlling the plaintiffs action. See
id. at 553, 745 A.2d at 529. Justice Verniero first explained that under
the plain language of the statute, any claim at law alleging
negligence, wrongful acts, or default must commence within two
years following the accrual of a cause of action. See id. (discussing
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2 (West 1987)). The justice also articulated
the principles underlying the statute by explaining the well-known
discovery rule of Lopez. See id. at 548, 745 A.2d at 526. The justice
characterized the discovery rule as an "equitable principle" that
delays the statutory time limitation until the plaintiff discovers a
possible "basis for an actionable claim." Id. (quoting Lopez, 62 N.J. at
272, 300 A.2d at 565). Justice Verniero also made clear that the
discovery rule suspends the statutory time-limit until a plaintiff gains
actual knowledge of an existing cause of action. See id. The justice
additionally iterated that the protection provided by the discovery
rule terminates when reasonable diligence and intelligence would
reveal an actionable claim or injury. See id.
Expanding this analytical framework, the court next scrutinized
the elements of a claim under New Jersey's Workers' Compensation
scheme. See id. at 555, 745 A.2d at 530 (discussing N.J. Stat. Ann. §
34:15 (West 1988)). Reciting the statutory elements, the court noted
that both the worker's petition and the employer's response must be
verified by an oath or affirmation. See id. (discussing N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 34:15-51, 52 (West 1988)). The purpose of these procedures, the
court continued, is to narrow general claims for compensation
through the use of specific pleadings and factual averments. See id.
(citing Conway v. Mister Softee, Inc., 51 N.J. 254, 261, 239 A.2d 241
(1968)). The justice reasoned that consideration of the medical
background summarized in Lapka's petition was necessary to
preserve the integrity of the workers' compensation regime and the
Division's reliance on sworn statements. See id. Justice Verniero
supported this conclusion with decisions in numerous jurisdictions
holding that sworn, signed workers' compensation petitions establish
the claimant's knowledge of the factual allegations recited. See id.
(citing Meeker v. American Torque Rod of Ohio, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 874, 87888 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Ackler v. Raymark Indus., 551 A.2d 291, 293
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Price v. Johns-Manville Corp., 485 A.2d 466, 470
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)). Justice Verniero next turned to the degree of
certainty contemplated by the discovery rule. See id. at 555-56, 745
A.2d at 530. Rejecting a stringent application of the doctrine, the
justice crafted a broad definition of imputed knowledge through an
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objective reasonableness standard. See id. The justice narrated New
Jersey precedent stressing that the discovery rule applies uniformly to
all substantive areas of the law. See id. at 556, 745 A.2d at 530
(quoting Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291-93, 386 A.2d 1310,
1314-15 (1978)). No particularized legal or medical skill is required
to discern a cause of action, Justice Verniero reminded, as a plaintiff
is imputed only reasonable knowledge and not subjective certainty.
See id. Summarizing this standard, the justice concluded that the
discovery rule demands only those facts procured by ordinary
diligence and sufficient to alert a reasonable person that another's
conduct "may have caused or contributed" to the injury. Id. at 531,
745 A.2d at 555 (quoting Savage v. Old Bridge-SayervilleMed. Group, 134
N.J. 241, 248, 633 A.2d 514, 518 (1993)).
Narrowing its focus, the court synthesized discovery rule
precedent to further explicate statutory tolling in toxic tort claims.
See id. at 557, 745 A.2d at 531. The court considered a prior New
Jersey Supreme Court case in which the court held that medical
records containing information sufficient to impute knowledge must
be balanced against the delays caused by an improper physician
diagnosis. See id. (discussing Vispisiano v. Ashland Chem. Co., 107 N.J.
416, 437, 527 A.2d 66, 77 (1987)). The Vispisiano court, Justice
Verniero continued, carefully distinguished facts providing "some
reasonable medical support" from a stricter requirement of "medical
confirmation." See id. The justice therefore stressed that the liberal
threshold of the discovery rule requires only medical facts sufficient
to inform the reasonable patient that a more reliable diagnosis of
injury is needed. See id.
Having outlined the scope of the discovery rule, Justice Verniero
turned to the procedures used by trial courts to determine imputed
knowledge.
See id. at 558-59, 745 A.2d at 531-32.
Although
application of the discovery rule normally involves a preliminary
hearing concerning disputed facts and knowledge, the court recalled
the credibility exception created in Lopez. See id. In Lopez, Justice
Verniero observed, conflicts concerning a plaintiff's knowledge not
involving issues of witness credibility may be resolved through
affidavits optionally supported by depositions. See id. at 559, 745 A.2d
at 532 (citing Lopez, 62 N.J. at 275, 300 A.2d at 567). Evidence
demonstrating a plaintiffs knowledge of the essential facts
underlying a potential cause of action, the justice stressed, concludes
a trial court's inquiry into applicability of the discovery rule. See id.
Applying the proper framework to Lapka's situation, the court
first appraised Lapka's medical records, specifically noting Essex's
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decision in 1981 to alleviate Lapka's chronic illness by reassigning
him to a "less toxic area." See id. at 554, 745 A.2d at 530. These
workplace restrictions, the justice determined, combined with the
concurrent diagnoses of Lapka's personal physician and Essex's
company doctor were sufficient to alert a reasonable person of the
potentially injurious impact of factory toxins. See id. The court
further declared that Lapka's workers' compensation petition firmly
established knowledge, noting that Lapka attributed his illness to
asbestos inhalation. See id. at 555, 745 A.2d at 530. Doubting the
plaintiff's claim of medical uncertainty, the justice determined that
Hermele's professional conclusions rested upon Lapka's proffered
medical history and suggesting knowledge of asbestos exposure prior
to the doctor's diagnosis in 1986. See id. at 556-57, 745 A.2d at 531.
The justice then distinguished the decision in Vispisiano by
comparing the diligent efforts of the plaintiff in that case with the
existing pattern of knowledge shown in Lapka's own medical records.
See id. at 557, 745 A.2d at 531. The court stressed that, unlike the
facts in Vispisiano, Lapka's physicians consistently confirmed
symptoms of asbestos and pulmonary illnesses. See id. The court,
therefore, declared that ample medical evidence supported Lapka's
own theory of causation, satisfying the minimal requirements of the
discovery rule. See id. Completing its analysis, the court agreed with
the appellate division's assessment that the complete record
"unquestionably" established Lapka's knowledge of a potential cause
of action, and removed the need to conduct a full hearing on the
discovery rule. See id. at 558, 745 A.2d at 532.
Justice Verniero concluded the court's holding by cautiously
noting the particular facts supporting application of the discovery
rule in this case. See id. Remarking that the discovery rule stems from
the doctrines of equity, the justice repeated the importance of
extending fairness to all parties, not merely the injured litigants. See
id. Although sympathetic to the hardships imposed on toxic tort
victims, the court nonetheless held that Lapka's circumstances were
clearly beyond the equitable boundaries of the discovery rule. See id.
In dissent, Justice Stein, joined by Justice O'Hern, attacked the
majority's treatment of Lapka's medical records and proffered that a
preliminary hearing on the applicability of the discovery rule was
warranted. See id. at 558-59, 745 A.2d at 532 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Justice Stein first recounted the record on appeal, finding that no
medical diagnosis linking Lapka's respiratory ailments with asbestos
was present until late 1988. See id. at 559, 745 A.2d at 532-33 (Stein,
J., dissenting). The justice then discussed a competing principle of
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the law that governs statutory limits in complex medical litigation. See
id. at 564, 745 A.2d at 535 (Stein, J., dissenting). Although agreeing
with the need for an objective reasonableness standard, Justice Stein
insisted on medical confirmation of illness, beyond "mere
speculation" by the plaintiff. See id. (citing Mancuso v. Neckles, 163 N.J.
Justice Stein accordingly
26, 34, 747 A.2d 255, 260 (2000)).
interpreted Lapka's self-diagnosed asbestos exposure as insufficient
given controlling precedent insisting that toxic tort plaintiffs confirm
their impressions through reasonable medical support. See id. at 56566, 745 A.2d at 536 (Stein,J., dissenting).
Returning to the record, Justice Stein chastised the majority's
characterization of Lapka's workers' compensation petition. See id. at
566, 745 A.2d at 536. The justice questioned the evidentiary strength
of Lapka's petition, noting that the inclusive list also attributed
injuries to "noise," "chemicals," and twelve other generic pollutants.
See id. While conceding that some plausible inference of knowledge
was possible, the dissent speculated that Lapka's workers'
compensation attorneys inserted the asbestos allegation only to
bolster their case for benefits. See id.
Justice Stein subsequently rebutted the court's string citation of
authority by exposing factual variations that supported the dissent's
proposed standard of notice. See id. at 567, 745 A.2d at 537 (Stein, J.,
dissenting). Instead, Justice Stein approvingly cited a bright-line
standard established by the Texas Supreme Court that insists on
demonstrable objective verification of any claimed occupational
injury. See id. at 566-67, 745 A.2d at 537 (quoting Childs v. Haussecker,
974 S.W.2d 21, 42-43 (Tex. 1998)). Applying this standard to Lapka's
history, Justice Stein conceded that Hermele's March 24, 1986
examination was potentially sufficient to provide notice. See id. The
dissent remained firm, however, in emphasizing that the lengthy list
of potential toxins in Hermele's report appeared insufficient to satisfy
the Vispisiano standard of "reasonable medical support." See id. at
566, 745 A.2d at 536.
Justice Stein concluded by seeking refuge in the court's limited
holding and recognized that the court eschewed per se accrual of
actionable injuries in all workers' compensation petitions. See id. at
567-68, 745 A.2d at 537 (Stein, J., dissenting). Viewing the evidence
as ambiguous, Justice Stein lamented the court's weakening of the
Vispisiano holding and recommended remand of the action for a full
opportunity to evaluate imposition of the statutory bar. See id. at 559,
745 A.2d at 532 (Stein,J., dissenting).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court is continually faced with novel
and difficult factual applications of the discovery rule. Complicated
issues of medical causation in toxic tort litigation spotlight the
problems inherent in time-limited causes of action. Rather than
attach additional uncertainty to the discovery rule, the court soundly
relied on the particular facts demonstrating the plaintiffs knowledge
to reach a reasonable inference of discovery. Declining to apply the
equitable tolling provisions of the discovery rule is a sensible response
to a record rife with a host of medically confirmed ailments
prominently labeled by the injured plaintiff as an actionable claim.
Justice Stein's dissent professes little disagreement with the
majority's reasoning, choosing instead to challenge the court's
decision to resolve the factual dispute at all. Justice Stein accepts the
plaintiffs knowledge and the possibility of an imputed statutory bar
to his claim. The dissent, however, envisions a broader place for the
discovery rule in latent causation, preferring the detailed combing of
a trial court's evidentiary review to the majority's reliance on an
appellate record. The court's varying directions, therefore, may
reflect less on the application of the discovery rule than on the
proper function of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Faced with the
possibility of a lengthy and expensive retrial on a concededly close
factual matter, the NewJersey Supreme Court demonstrated a serious
commitment to enforcing statutory limitations by embracing the
opportunity to resolve the legal matter at hand.
PaulB. Matey

EVIDENCE-PRIOR CRIME EVIDENCE FOR IDENTIFICATION-LINKAGE
ANALYSIS Is NOT A SCIENTIFICALLY RELIABLE METHOD OF
IDENTIFICATION, BUT EVIDENCE OF A PRIOR CRIME CAN BE
INTRODUCED AS LONG AS IT IS SIMILAR; A SPECIALIZED JURY
INSTRUCTION MUST BE PRESENTED IN SUCH A CASE TO PREVENT
UNFAIR PREJUDICE-State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517, 745 A.2d 509 (2000).
On August 11, 1994, Melissa Padilla's boyfriend discovered her
body in a concrete drainage pipe in the Avenel section of
Woodbridge Township. See State v. Fortin, 162 N.J. 517, 519, 745 A.2d
509, 510 (2000). Padilla's assailant had raped, brutally beaten, and
ultimately murdered her by manual strangulation. See id. at 520, 745
A.2d at 510. Her face was badly beaten, and her nose had been
broken. Near the body, the police discovered various personal items,
including Padilla's pants, which still had her underwear inside. An
autopsy revealed that Padilla's body had suffered rectal tearing, as
well as bite marks on the left side of her chin, her left breast, and left
nipple.
On April 3, 1995, during a routine traffic stop, Maine State
Trooper Vicki Gardner stopped to question the driver of a vehicle
parked on the shoulder of a road. After noticing that the driver,
defendant Steven Fortin, smelled of alcohol, Gardner administered a
sobriety test and called for backup. See id., 745 A.2d at 510-11.
Before the backup officers arrived, Fortin grabbed Gardner by the
throat and strangled her until she nearly lost consciousness. See id.,
745 A.2d at 511. Fortin then removed Gardner's pants, underwear,
and bra and sexually assaulted her.
As the backup officers
approached, Fortin fled the scene with Gardner in his car. Though
Fortin punched Gardner in the face while driving, the trooper
succeeded in jumping free from the speeding vehicle. After Fortin
lost control of his vehicle farther down the road, the police captured
him as he fled on foot. In addition to suffering from a severe
beating, a broken nose, and manual strangulation, Gardner had
received bites on her left chin, as well as her left breast and left
nipple. She also experienced injuries resulting from vaginal and anal
rape. See id. at 521, 745 A.2d at 511. When found in her patrol car,
Gardner's pants still contained her underwear. Fortin pled guilty in
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Maine to charges relating to these events. See id. at 523, 745 A.2d at
512.
Maine authorities notified officers in New Jersey of the charges
See id. at 521, 745 A.2d at 511.
New Jersey
against Fortin.
investigators of the Padilla murder discovered that Fortin had resided
in Avenel at the time of that crime. The investigators also learned
that Fortin and his girlfriend had argued and separated earlier on the
night of the murder. Moreover, Fortin's girlfriend observed that,
later that night, he had scratches on his chest, head, and neck. An
expert examination of the bite marks on Padilla's body revealed that
Fortin had inflicted the wounds on Padilla's breast and that he
"could" have caused the other wounds.
The State of New Jersey brought capital murder charges against
Fortin. See id. at 519, 745 A.2d at 510. The State sought to present
evidence of the Maine crime against Fortin. See id. The law division
held a pretrial evidentiary hearing under New Jersey Rule of
Evidence 104 to determine the admissibility of the evidence of the
Maine crime, as well as that of the expert report and opinions of
Robert Hazelwood. See id. at 521, 745 A.2d at 511. Hazelwood, a
veteran military police and FBI investigator, is an expert in linkage
analysis, a procedure used by investigators in which modus operandi
and ritualistic characteristics of different crimes are analyzed to
determine if they were committed by the same person. See id. at 521,
523, 745 A.2d at 511, 512. Hazelwood reviewed both the Padilla and
Gardner attacks and concluded that the modus operandi of both
crimes shared fifteen common aspects. See id. at 522, 745 A.2d at 51112. Also, Hazelwood found that the two crimes had five ritualistic
aspects in common, including the bites to the chin, bites to the
breast, brutal beating of the face, anal penetration, and manual
strangulation. See id. at 523, 745 A.2d at 512. After reviewing all of
the evidence, Hazelwood determined that the odds of different
offenders committing the two crimes to be highly unlikely. See id.
The law division ruled that the evidence of the Maine crime,
with the exception of Fortin's guilty plea, was admissible against
Fortin as other-crimes evidence under New Jersey Rule of Evidence
404(b). See id. The trial court reasoned that evidence of the crime in
Maine was similar in kind, reasonably close in time, relevant to the
issue of identity, and showed by clear and convincing evidence that
Fortin had committed the crime in Maine. See id. The law division
also concluded that the probative value of the other-crime evidence
outweighed its possible prejudicial effect. See id.
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Turning to the admissibility of Hazelwood's testimony as an
expert under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702, the law division held
that Hazelwood could testify as an expert. See id. To determine
admissibility, the law division applied the standard of State v. Kelly and
held that the analysis of ritualistic crimes and modus operandi in
homicides to be "beyond the knowledge, experience, or ability of the
average fact-finder." Id. at 524, 745 A.2d at 512-13 (citing State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984)). The law division also found
that the law enforcement and investigation community sufficiently
relied upon the theory of Hazelwood's testimony and that Hazelwood
had qualified expertise to offer his intended testimony. See id., 745
A.2d at 512.
The defendant made an interlocutory appeal to the appellate
division seeking reversal of the law division's decision. See id., 745
A.2d at 513. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's New
Jersey Rule of Evidence 404(b) other-evidence ruling. See id. The
appellate division held that there was no "clear error of judgment" or
"manifest denial of justice" that required a reversal of the law
division. See id. Though less prejudicial evidence proving identity was
available, the appellate division noted that this evidence was weak and
might not persuade a jury. See id. The appellate division, however,
ruled that, in order to minimize prejudice, which is inherent in
other-crimes evidence, only those aspects of the Maine crime
necessary to prove identity were admissible. See id. The appellate
court suggested that the prosecution and defense reach an
agreement as to which aspects of the Maine incident should be
admitted. See id.
In contrast, the appellate division reversed the law division's
determination as to the admissibility of Hazelwood's testimony. See
id. The appellate division held that the analysis lacked sufficient
reliability for admission as expert evidence. See id. Determining
Hazelwood's analysis to be, in fact, an application of behavioral
science, the appellate division ruled that his testimony should be
examined under the standard for admitting scientific evidence. See
id. at 525, 745 A.2d at 513. Applying those standards, the appellate
division found that the dissimilarities between the two incidents, in
addition to the small sample size, required exclusion of the
testimony. See id. The appellate division also noted that Hazelwood
actually was testifying to the ultimate issue in the case and would
present nothing more than an expert opinion that Fortin committed
the Padilla murder. See id.
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Both Fortin and the State of New Jersey made motion for leave
to appeal the appellate division's decision. See id. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted both motions and affirmed the holding of
the appellate division. See id. Justice O'Hem, writing for a majority
of six judges, first analyzed the admissibility of the expert testimony
of Hazelwood. See id. at 525-29, 745 A.2d at 513-15. The court held
that the testimony was not admissible and that linkage analysis lacks
"sufficient scientific reliability" to establish that the same person
committed both crimes. See id at 525, 745 A.2d at 513. Justice
O'Hern likened linkage analysis to rapist profile evidence. See id at
526, 745 A.2d at 513. Rapist profile evidence, the justice noted, had
been held inadmissible in State v. Cavallo, in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court found that such evidence did not have general
acceptance in the scientific community. See id. (citing State v. Cavallo,
88 N.J. 508, 521, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1982)). Though Hazelwood
did possess expertise that was "beyond the ken of the average juror,"
the court found that his testimony was not sufficiently reliable to
establish him as an expert. Id., 745 A.2d at 514.
Continuing, Justice O'Hern noted that linkage analysis has not
reached such a state of the art so as to be as scientifically reliable as
DNA testing. See id. at 527, 745 A.2d at 514. The court also explained
that the linkage analysis field, which consists merely of Hazelwood
and a small number of his associates, is too minute a community for
effective peer review of his theories. See id. The court, however,
opined that Hazelwood's testimony could have a proper role in a
criminal trial, particularly on the issue of other-crime evidence. See
id. at 528, 745 A.2d at 515. A witness such as Hazelwood, the court
noted, can illustrate similarities between crimes as long as there is no
testimony as to the ultimate issue of the case. See id.
The court next turned to the admissibility under New Jersey
Rule of Evidence 404(b) of the other-crimes evidence. See id. at 529,
745 A.2d at 515. Acknowledging that New Jersey codified the
common-law rule establishing evidence of another crime as relevant
to prove identity, Justice O'Hern discussed precedential limitations
on the use of other-crime evidence as a means to prevent overuse of
such evidence. See id. (quoting N.J. R. Evid. 404(b)). The justice
noted that, in State v. Cofied, the New Jersey Supreme Court
articulated that other-crimes evidence must possess the following
requisite characteristics to be admissible: (1) the evidence is relevant
to an issue that is material and genuinely in dispute; (2) the evidence
"must be similar in kind and be reasonably close in time to the
offense"; (3) the evidence must be "clear and convincing" that the
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defendant committed the other crime; and (4) the evidence's
probative value cannot be outweighed by the apparent prejudice. Id
(citing Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338, 605 A.2d at 235). Moreover, the court
elucidated that other-crimes evidence is best understood in
"signature" crimes in which a distinctive feature common to two
crimes permits the jury to infer more than the defendant's propensity
to commit such a crime. See id., 745 A.2d at 516 (citing Cofield, 127
N.J. at 336, 605 A.2d at 234).
Justice O'Hern next analyzed the manner in which lower New
Jersey courts have addressed other-crimes evidence. See id. at 530-31,
745 A.2d at 516-17. In particular, the justice discussed the case of
State v. Reldan, in which the appellate division held that the evidence
of another crime involving a "use of force to throat" could not be
admissible to establish identity. Id. at 530, 745 A.2d at 516 (citing
State v. Reldan, 185 N.J. Super. 494, 502-03, 449 A.2d 1317, 1322 (App.
Div. 1982)). In that case, Justice O'Hern noted, the appellate
division concluded that a greater degree of similarity is needed
between a charged and uncharged crime to prove identity. See id.
Furthermore, the justice recalled that the court held that the
evidence must show in both crimes a nearly identical handiwork that
is distinctive enough to be a signature. See id. (citing Reldan, 185 N.J.
Super. at 502-03, 449 A.2d at 1322). Justice O'Hern, while noting
that some sources have suggested a stricter standard for the
admission of other-crime evidence to demonstrate a method of
operation, approved of the standard set forth in Reldan. See id. at 532,
745 A.2d at 517. Thus, the court held that for other-crimes evidence
to be admissible for identity, the prior acts must be nearly identical so
as to earmark the acts as the perpetrator's handiwork, the conduct
must be "unusual and distinctive so as to be a signature," and both
crimes must have sufficient proof of facts to establish a pattern. Id.
(citing Reldan, 185 N.J. Super. at 502, 449 A.2d at 1322).
Justice O'Hern warned, however, that the law is easier to state
than to apply. See id. The court was cautious in its acceptance of the
factors cited by Hazelwood as demonstrative of an unusual pattern,
especially because the defendant claimed there were sixteen
differences between the Maine and New Jersey crimes. See id. While
not requiring an expert to examine the similarities between the
crimes, the majority opined that Hazelwood's testimony could be
helpful to the trial court in determining the existence of an unusual
pattern. See id., 745 A.2d at 518. Such testimony, the court
explained, would assist the trial court in initially determining the
admissibility of other-crime evidence and would also help the jury to
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understand when a crime was unusual and was the handiwork of one
person. See id. at 533, 745 A.2d at 518.
Justice O'Hern, commenting on the law division's reliance on
Hazelwood's testimony in determining the admissibility of the Maine
evidence, noted that Hazelwood had not seen a similar combination
of characteristics in reviewing 4000 cases. See id. If those cases could
be compiled into a database, the justice posited, Hazelwood's premise
could be tested, and his testimony would not pose any of the
concerns of improper use of experts. See id. The court further
opined that Hazelwood's testimony would not receive uncritical
acceptance, does not interpret matters that are commonplace, and
does not infringe on the jury's ability to decide the ultimate issue. See
id. Essentially, the majority elaborated, Hazelwood's testimony was
nothing more than a mere description of the crimes' physical
circumstances. See id.
Finally, turning to the issue of jury instructions, Justice O'Hern
highlighted the importance of the jury instruction for other-crime
evidence. See id. at 534, 745 A.2d at 518. Given the prejudice
inherent in such evidence, the justice warned of the need for a
"carefully crafted limiting instruction" clearly delineating the limited
purpose of the evidence. See id. A mere recantation of New Jersey
Rule of Evidence 404(b), the court admonished, is not enough to
accomplish this task. See id., 745 A.2d at 519. Further, the court
provided a sample jury instruction that the trial court could use
properly to charge the jury in a case involving other-crime evidence
used for the purpose of identification. See id. Justice O'Hern also
requested that the Committee on Model Criminal Charges
recommend any changes for the charge the court had crafted. See id.
at 535, 745 A.2d at 519.
In a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Long
agreed with the majority regarding Hazelwood's qualification as an
expert witness. See id. at 542, 745 A.2d at 523 (Long, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The justice, however, strongly dissented
from the majority's holding that a proper limiting instruction could
prevent the use of other-crime evidence as propensity evidence. See
id. at 535, 745 A.2d at 519 (Long, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Pointing to precedent that excluded other-crime
evidence used for impeachment purposes despite a limiting
instruction, Justice Long argued that the potential for misuse of the
evidence by the jury is the same in the context of identification. See
id. at 536, 745 A.2d at 519-20 (Long, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 391, 625 A.2d
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1085, 1092 (1993)). Justice Long opined that ajury, upon hearing of
the brutal attack on Gardner, could be lured into punishing Fortin
for his "body of crime" instead of for his guilt in murdering Padilla.
See id. at 537, 745 A.2d at 520 (Long, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The justice noted, however, that prior crime
evidence would not similarly prejudice the defendant in every case.
See id.
Furthermore, the court maintained that, under New Jersey Rule
of Evidence 404(b), admission of other-crime evidence is
inappropriate if less inflammatory evidence on the issue is available.
See id. Justice Long pointed to the testimony of Fortin's girlfriend,
the bite mark identification on Padilla's breast, and the presence of
Fortin's DNA at the scene as proof of sufficient evidence of Fortin's
identification, thereby abrogating the need for Maine crime
evidence. See id. at 537-38, 745 A.2d at 520-21 (Long, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Disagreeing with the trial judge's
decision to allow the evidence because "a jury might not be
persuaded," Justice Long opined this could not possibly be an
appropriate standard because it would lead to the "piling on of
prejudicial and inflammatory other crimes evidence." Id. at 538, 745
A.2d at 521 (Long,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Long also parted with the majority on the issue of
allowing the Maine crime evidence to be admitted without an expert.
See id. Noting that all prior crime evidence is problematic, Justice
Long opined that other-crime evidence offered to prove identity is
"the greatest threat to a fair trial" given the increased hazard of
misuse. Id. at 539, 745 A.2d at 521 (Long, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). As such, Justice Long maintained that there is a
higher standard for admission of such evidence when used for the
purpose of identification. See id. To be admissible, the justice
explained, the other-crime evidence must not only be similar to the
offense charged, but must also have been committed by unique or
extraordinary means. See id. (citing Reldan, 185 N.J. Super. at 501,
449 A.2d at 1321). Justice Long opined that these two separate
prongs must be satisfied and that a high number of similarities
between the crimes does not establish uniqueness. See id. at 540, 745
A.2d at 522 (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Continuing, Justice Long argued that uniqueness is required because
"mere similarity" points only to predisposition of a defendant. See id.
The majority, according to Justice Long, collapsed the two
prongs together by allowing, but not requiring, an expert. See id.
Justice Long argued that the question of uniqueness is complicated,
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and a jury needs a proper expert's opinion to understand what to
make of the various factors that may establish a crime's extraordinary
qualities. See id at 541, 745 A.2d at 522 (Long, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Positing that the issue of uniqueness is a
matter not within the ken of the jury, Justice Long pointed to the fact
that the prosecution proffered the expert in the first place. See id.,
745 A.2d at 522-23 (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Continuing, Justice Long asserted that the facts in this case
revealed no obvious extraordinary or unique signature. See id., 745
A.2d at 523 (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Without an expert to present the evidence, Justice Long propounded
that the Maine crime evidence lacked the probative value necessary
to establish identity. See id. The justice argued that, because
Hazelwood was not qualified to be an expert, the evidence should be
excluded because an expert is necessary for proper interpretation.
See id. at 542, 745 A.2d at 523 (Long, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Linkage analysis is an excellent tool for law enforcement when
investigating crimes. Its usefulness in a criminal trial, however, is
severely limited. The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly held that
the theory of linkage analysis lacked sufficient scientific reliability to
warrant Hazelwood's qualification as a witness. An investigator's tool
cannot properly be elevated to a level of scientific reliability on par
with DNA testing. Linkage analysis is, essentially, an application of a
veteran investigator's opinion as to the perpetrator of a specific
crime. A court cannot properly cloak an officer's testimony as to the
identity of a criminal with an aura of science. This would unfairly
prejudice a defendant and would allow an expert to testify to the
ultimate issue of a case based upon a theory with dubious evidentiary
reliability.
The majority was mistaken in not requiring an expert to testify
on the similarities between the two crimes. The facts presented in
the record do not clearly demonstrate that these two crimes were so
similar and unique. By observing that Hazelwood's testimony could
help the jury understand the evidence, the court is admitting that it is
not clear to an average jury that the Maine and NewJersey crimes are
similar or unique. If the Maine and New Jersey crimes were so
unique, the jury would need no assistance from Hazelwood in
analyzing the two crimes. Given the danger of unfair prejudice
inherent in the presentation of other-crime evidence at trial, the
court should have adhered to a stricter standard and required the
crimes to be unique as well as similar. The issue of uniqueness
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should be clear to a jury. If it is not, then only that testimony that
meets the standards of expert testimony should be presented to the
jury to assist in the determination of identification. Anything less
could very easily damage a defendant's right to a fair trial.
The majority also falsely pins its hopes on a proper jury
instruction to prevent unfair prejudice to the defendant. The dry
record of these crimes instills revulsion in the average reader. Ajury,
upon seeing and hearing far more graphic and descriptive testimony
of the Maine crime, could very easily disregard even the most
carefully crafted limiting instruction. Considering that the evidence
will be reviewed and interpreted by the "non-expert" Hazelwood, a
jury will likely convict Fortin for either his prior crime or because he
had the propensity to commit the Padilla murder. The defendant
has the unenviable task of defending himself against a crime for
which he has already pled guilty. This is all the more daunting
because he most probably has to find a "non-expert" witness to rebut
Hazelwood's testimony. It would seem a near impossibility for a jury
to make an inference other than Fortin's propensity to commit the
crime with which he is charged. As a result of this decision,
defendants may see more proffers of other-crime evidence upheld,
with only a carefully limited jury instruction as protection from unfair
prejudice.
Michael Simitz

REAL PROPERTY-MUNICIPAL ZONING-SUCCESSORS IN INTEREST
MAY RELY ON PRIOR USE VARIANCE IF INTENDED USE OF PROPERTY IS
SUFFICIENTLY SIMILAR TO VARIANT USE-Stop & Shop Supermarket Co.
v. Board of Adjustment of Township of Springfield, 162 N.J. 418, 744 A.2d
1169 (2000).
In 1956, Saks Fifth Avenue (Saks) intended to build a
department store on a parcel of land straddling the border that
separates the New Jersey townships of Springfield and Millburn. See
Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Board of Adjustment of the Township of
Springfield, 162 N.J. 418, 422, 423-24, 744 A.2d 1169, 1171, 1172
(2000). The Springfield portion of the property was split-zoned into
roughly equal sections. See id. at 422, 744 A.2d at 1171. Whereas the
northern half of the Springfield property was zoned for commercial
use, the southern half was zoned for residential use.
Saks's
architectural plans called for its retail store to be constructed entirely
within the commercially zoned portion of the property. See id. at 423,
744 A.2d at 1172.
The store's planned parking lot, however,
encroached upon the residentially zoned portion of the property,
thereby requiring Saks to apply to Springfield's Board of Adjustment
(Board) for a use variance. See id. at 423-24, 744 A.2d at 1172.
After inspecting the site and hearing from nearby residents, the
Board decided to approve Saks's request for a use variance. See id. at
424, 744 A.2d at 1172. The Board observed that the residentially
zoned portion of Saks's property was too narrow for residential
development because of Springfield's "setback" requirements, which
require that houses be built a minimum number of feet from the
front and rear edges of a lot. See id., 744 A.2d at 1172-73. The Board
further reasoned that Saks's property was unsuitable for the
construction of residential units because it bordered a commercial
zone and would result in inconsistent housing patterns. See id. at 42425, 744 A.2d at 1173. The Board concluded that granting Saks's
application for a use variance was in the best interest of the
community because it would lead to increased property values in the
surrounding area. See id. at 425, 744 A.2d at 1173.
In 1968, Saks requested a second use variance from the Board
because a planned addition to the existing store extended into the
residentially zoned portion of the lot. The Board approved Saks's
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request after finding that Saks's lot was unsuited for residential
development and the addition was necessary to maintain the high
quality of Saks's department store, which was unique in the
community. Neither the 1956 nor the 1968 use variance contained a
limitation on the scope of the permitted retail use.
In 1994, plaintiff-appellant, the Stop & Shop Supermarket
Company (Stop & Shop), took possession of Saks's lot with the intent
of opening a supermarket. See id. at 426, 744 A.2d at 1173. Stop &
Shop informed Springfield's zoning officer of its plans and requested
confirmation that it could rely on the use variances previously
granted to Saks in 1956 and 1968. When the zoning officer denied
this request, Stop & Shop appealed to the Board. See id. at 426, 744
A.2d at 1174.
At an ensuing Board hearing, an architect testified on behalf of
Stop & Shop that the proposed supermarket would be roughly the
same size of the existing Saks department store. He further testified
that the proposed building, in comparison to the existing structure,
would encroach to a lesser extent onto the residentially zoned
portion of the property, but conceded that the supermarket would
require six additional loading docks for delivery trucks. See id. at 42627, 744 A.2d at 1174. At the same meeting, a long-time Millburn
resident testified on behalf of several objectors that Saks's
department store had been an upscale establishment that rarely
experienced a crowded parking lot and only remained open in the
evenings on two weekdays. See id. at 427, 744 A.2d at 1174. After
hearing from both sides, the Board voted overwhelmingly to affirm
the zoning officer's decision requiring Stop & Shop to apply for new
use variances. The Board explained that Stop & Shop had failed to
introduce evidence demonstrating "'that the supermarket business it
intends to operate on the property.., is of a similar kind, nature, or
use intensity to that of the Saks operation and thus cannot be
included or permitted under the variances previously granted for
Saks Fifth Avenue."' Id. (alteration in original).
Stop & Shop appealed the Board's ruling by filing a complaint in
the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division. See id. Reversing the
Board of Adjustment, the trial court held that Stop & Shop was not
required to apply for a new use variance to open a supermarket on
the Saks property. See id. at 427-28, 744 A.2d at 1174. The trial judge
observed that Springfield's commercial zoning ordinance failed to
distinguish between department stores and supermarkets, thereby
eliminating the need to decide whether Stop & Shop's intended use
of the lot "was qualitatively similar to Saks' use." Id. at 428, 744 A.2d
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at 1174-75. The Board appealed. See id. at 428, 744 A.2d at 1175.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed the trial
court and held that any significant change in the use of the property
required Stop & Shop to apply for a new variance because the Board,
in granting the 1956 and 1968 variances, had only considered Saks's
particular enterprise and circumstances. See id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted Stop & Shop's petition
for certification. See id. at 422, 744 A.2d at 1171. Reversing the
appellate division, the court held that the 1956 and 1968 variances,
permitting Saks to use the residentially zoned portion of its property
for accessory parking and a building expansion, could be relied upon
by Stop & Shop. See id. at 434, 744 A.2d at 1178. The court explained
that where, under all the relevant factors, the subsequent use of the
property is "sufficiently similar to the variant use," a successor in
interest may rely on a use variance granted to a prior occupant. Id. at
438, 744 A.2d at 1180.
Justice Stein, writing on behalf of a majority, began his opinion
with a broad discussion of the zoning principles at issue in the case.
See id. at 429, 744 A.2d at 1175. The justice observed that New
Jersey's first zoning statute permitted municipalities to grant a use
variance if doing so was in the public interest and avoided undue
hardship. See id. (citing L. 1924, c. 146, § 7(3)). Under the current
statute, the justice explained, use variances are issued when an
applicant establishes that "special reasons" exist. See id. at 430, 744
A.2d at 1176 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55-70d (West 1991)). Justice
Stein clarified that the "special reasons" standard requires a
successful applicant to submit evidence demonstrating either that the
use in question furthers the general welfare because the use is
particularly well suited to the location in question or that unnecessary
hardship would result from denying the application because the
particular property is not suitable for a conforming use. See id. at 431,
744 A.2d at 1176.
Justice Stein next stated the general rule that "'a variance
granted becomes attached to the land and is not a mere personal
right, and a purchaser takes the land free from those zoning
restrictions to which the variance pertains."' Id. at 432, 744 A.2d at
1177 (quoting Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal
Corporations, § 25.163 (3d ed. 1991)). To explain why variances run
with the land rather than with the applicant, Justice Stein turned to a
New York Court of Appeals opinion. See id. at 433-34, 744 A.2d at
1178 (citing Dexter v. Town Bd. of Gates, 324 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1975)).
In Dexter,Justice Stein explained, the New York court postulated that
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zoning revolves primarily around land use irrespective of its owners
or occupants. See id. at 434, 744 A.2d at 1178.
Justice Stein readily conceded that a supermarket is in many
respects unlike a department store and may result in a more intense
use of land. See id. at 435, 744 A.2d at 1179. The justice explained,
however, that the decisive factor in the court's holding was that the
zoning ordinance in effect when Stop & Shop requested permission
to rely on Saks's use variances failed to distinguish between these two
uses. See id. The justice explained that Springfield's 1994 ordinance
defined "retail sales and service stores," which was a permissible use
in the commercially zoned portion of Saks's property, to include both
retail department stores and supermarkets. See id. This led to the
inescapable conclusion, Justice Stein opined, that Stop & Shop was
entitled to rely on the 1956 and 1968 variances. See id.
Justice Stein proceeded to provide additional factors that
supported the court's holding. See id. For example, the justice
interjected that municipal zoning boards are bound by the doctrine
of res judicata. See id. Justice Stein concluded that this doctrine
prohibits the Board from contradicting its previous findings in 1956
and 1968 that the residentially zoned portion of the property was
unsuitable for residential development. See id. at 436, 744 A.2d at
1179.
The court also relied on a recent New Jersey Supreme Court
decision in which the court struck down a local ordinance requiring
businesses to remove on-site nonconforming signs when the primary
use of the site changed. See id. (citing Rogers v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment of Village of Ridgewood, 158 N.J. 11, 726 A.2d 258 (1999)).
The majority explained that the ordinance at issue in Rogers was
invalidated because the municipality lacked the authority to deny
property owners the protection given to nonconforming structures
under New Jersey's statutes simply because the primary use of the
property changes. See id. (citing NJ. Stat. Ann. § 40:55D-68 (West
1991)). Since use variances enjoy greater protection under New
Jersey's law than nonconforming uses, the justice continued,
Springfield could not prohibit Stop & Shop from relying on Saks's
use variances merely because the primary use of the property had
changed. See id.
Finally, Justice Stein discredited testimony delivered at the
Board's meeting by objectors who attested to the upscale and
dignified atmosphere of the defunct Saks department store. See id.
The justice speculated that the property in question might have just
as easily been purchased by a less upscale department store whose
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sales volume, traffic patterns, and hours of operation would be
significantly more disruptive on the surrounding neighborhood than
Saks's department store. See id. at 437, 744 A.2d at 1180. Yet it is
beyond dispute, the justice declared, that the second retail store
could rely on Saks's variances even though it was subjecting the
property to a more intense use. See id. This demonstrated, in Justice
Stein's opinion, that "'all too often the administrative...
determination seems to turn on the identity of the applicant or
intended user, rather than upon neutral planning and zoning
principles.'" Id. (quoting Dexter, 324 N.E.2d at 871 (N.Y. 1975)).
The justice warned that zoning boards must be prepared to
accept that successors in interest, who belong in the same use
category as the original applicant yet engage in a different retailing
business, may rely on a prior variance. See id. The majority next
rejected the standard offered by Justice Coleman in his dissenting
opinion, which would require a successor use to be "essentially
duplicative" of the original use in order to rely on the prior variance.
See id. (emphasis added). Instead, Justice Stein explained that, in
order to receive the benefit of a prior variance, a successor use must
simply be "sufficiently similar to the variant use." Id. (emphasis
added).
The court explained that Stop & Shop met this less
restrictive standard because the Springfield zoning ordinance in
effect when Stop & Shop applied for permission to rely on the prior
variances grouped department stores and supermarkets together in
the same category of permissible uses. See id.
Justice Stein suggested that there are alternative channels
through which Springfield may address any concerns it has
concerning Stop & Shop's intended use of the property. See id. at
438, 744 A.2d at 1181. For example, the justice explained that local
planning boards possess the power under New Jersey's Municipal
Land Use Law to grant or deny site plan applications and to enforce
compliance with the site plan ordinance. See id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann.
§§ 40:55D-1 to -129 (West 1991)).
Finally, the court announced that it was not deciding the
appropriate legal standard municipalities should apply in assessing
what restrictions or conditions they may impose on the ability of a
successor in interest to rely on a use variance provided to a prior
owner. See id. at 439, 744 A.2d at 1181. Resolution of that question,
Justice Stein explained, is simplified where "the successor use either
is identical to the prior use or is placed in the same use category by
the municipal zoning ordinance." Id. Where this is not the case,
however, the justice conceded that determining whether a
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subsequent landowner may benefit from a prior variance becomes
significantly more difficult, particularly if the two uses share some
similarity. See id.
Justice Coleman, joined by Justice Garibaldi, dissented, asserting
that the Board could reasonably conclude that Stop & Shop's
proposed use of the property for a large supermarket substantially
differed from Saks's use of the lot for a department store and
therefore required a new use variance, especially in light of Stop &
Shop's decision not to present evidence to the contrary. See id. at
441, 744 A.2d at 1182 (Coleman, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice
Coleman stressed that traffic is a valid concern and the Board could
reasonably infer that a large supermarket would lead to a more
intense use of the parking lot. See id. at 444-45, 744 A.2d at 1184
(Coleman, J., dissenting).
The dissent also criticized the majority for conceding that not
every subsequent landowner may rely on a prior use variance, yet
failing to offer a standard by which to make that determination. See
id. at 446, 744 A.2d at 1185 (Coleman, J., dissenting). Justice
Coleman suggested that a successor in interest should be required to
demonstrate that the intended use is "'essentially duplicative in all
respects of that previously in existence pursuant to the variance.'" Id.
(quoting IndustrialLessors, Inc. v. City of Garfield, 119 N.J. Super. 181,
183, 290 A.2d 737, 738 (App. Div. 1972)). Applying that standard to
Stop & Shop, Justice Coleman concluded that a supermarket would
substantially change the impact on both the surrounding
neighborhood and Springfield's zoning scheme. See id. at 447, 744
A.2d at 1185 (Coleman, J., dissenting). Stop & Shop's proposed
supermarket, the justice declared, would most assuredly result in a
substantial increase in traffic. See id.
Justice Coleman also insisted that the Board could not have
foreseen in 1956, when it issued the variance to Saks department
store, that some forty years later the property would be converted to a
large supermarket. See id. at 448, 744 A.2d at 1185-86 (Coleman, J.,
dissenting). Nor could the Board have anticipated in 1956, the
dissent explained, that it would one day be required to set aside a
percentage of its land for low and middle-income housing. See id.,
744 A.2d at 1186 (Coleman, J., dissenting) (citing Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713
(1975); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27D-301 to 329 (West 1986)). For these reasons, the dissent concluded that the
Board's decision to require Stop & Shop to apply for a new use
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variance should be affirmed. See id. at 449, 744 A.2d 1186 (Coleman,
J., dissenting).
As is often the case, the issues in Stop & Shop's appeal are
perhaps best understood in terms of burdens of proof and legal
presumptions.
For example, the majority stressed that both
supermarkets and retail department stores were permissible
commercial uses under Springfield's 1994 zoning ordinance. This
single fact, the majority reasoned, created an irrebuttable
presumption that Stop & Shop was entitled to rely on Saks's prior use
variances. By comparison, the dissent would only allow for an
irrebuttable presumption permitting reliance on a prior use variance
where the intended use is "essentially duplicative" of the prior use.
See id. at 446, 744 A.2d at 1185 (Coleman, J., dissenting) (quoting
Industrial Lessors, 119 N.J. Super. at 183, 290 A.2d at 738)). The
dissent explained that where, as here, the subsequent occupant's
intended use of the property is not identical to the prior use, there
should be a rebuttable presumption against permitting reliance on a
prior variance. A presumption that Stop & Shop failed to rebut,
Justice Coleman noted, by electing not to introduce evidence at the
board hearing that its intended use of the property was substantially
similar to Saks's use of the property.
The question left unanswered by the majority's holding is
whether a successor in interest may rely on a prior use variance when
the present and prior uses are similar, but are not treated equally
under the zoning ordinance. Presumably the majority would favor a
rebuttable presumption permitting reliance in such instances,
whereas the dissent would prefer a rebuttable presumption against
such reliance. Although this issue was not squarely before the court,
its resolution would have been beneficial to municipalities, land
purchasers, and the lower courts in evaluating the correct standards
under which successors in interest may rely upon a prior use variance.
Stephen P. Warren

